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1962/11/14

MINING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action
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TOP SECRET

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TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1782, November 14, 8 p.m.

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PRIORITY

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CUBA

AT MTG WITH SYG THIS MORNING STEVENSON AND MCCLOY GAVE HIM
ACCOUNT OF PRESENT STATUS US-SOV NEGOTS.

SYG RESPONDED BY REPORTING ON HIS RECENT NEGOTS WITH CUBANS
AND SOVS ON UN VERIFICATION. THANT SAID HE HAD SOUNDED OUT
LECHUGA INFORMALLY NOV 8 ON ACCEPTABILITY FIVE LA AMBS IN CUBA
FOR DUAL PURPOSE OF VERIFYING WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
AND OF SERVING AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CUBAN GOVT IN
REGARD TO SOLUTION CUBAN CRISIS. ON NOV 11 LECHUGA INFORMED
SYG HIS GOVT'S RESPONSE TO FIRST FUNCTION PROPOSED FOR LA
AMBS WAS NEGATIVE AND ITS REACTION TO SECOND PROPOSED FUNCTION
WAS POSITIVE. WHEN SYG INQUIRED WHETHER CASTRO OBJECTS TO
LATIN AMERICANS PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS, LECHUGA REPLIED
IN THE NEGATIVE BUT ADDED THAT HIS GOVT IS UNHAPPY ABOUT
ACTION LA COUNTRIES IN OAS ON OCT 23.

CONSEQUENTLY ON NOV 12 SYG MADE FORMAL PROPOSAL IN WRIT-
ING TO LECHUGA PROPOSING, IN PLACE LA AMBS, GROUP OF AMBS FROM
"NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AFRICA, EUROPE AND LA
TO PERFORM SAME TWO FUNCTIONS, I.E., VERIFICATION AND LIAISON
BETWEEN CUBA AND UN. NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED TO THIS
SECOND PROPOSAL AND LECHUGA APPEARED TO EXPECT HIS GOVT'S
REPLY WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH ITS REACTION TO FIRST INFORMAL
PROPOSAL, THAT IS NEGATIVE ON VERIFICATION AND POSITIVE ON
LIAISON.

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CU 450

COTI-717/2

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-2- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

SYG CONTINUED THAT, WHILE HE, LIKE US AND USSR, FEELS SC MTG IS UNDESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE, HE NEVERTHELESS FEELS OBLIGATION TO REPORT TO SC IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE ALMOST THREE WEEKS HAS ELAPSED SINCE HIS APPEAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN CUBAN CRISIS. HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC NOV 16 FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF CASTRO'S REPLY TO HIS PROPOSAL. BOTH US REPS AND HIS OWN COLLEAGUES (BUNCHE AND LOUFFI) DISCOURAGED IDEA OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC AT THIS POINT WHILE NEGOTS ARE STILL IN FLUID STATE AND SYG APPEARED WILLING TO DELAY.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY HE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN PROPOSING NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN HAVANA SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CASTRO WAS THAT, PARTLY THROUGH THEIR GOOD OFFICES, CASTRO MIGHT BE GRADUALLY PULLED OUT OF ALL BLOCs AND INTO MILITARILY NON-ALIGNED POSITION WHICH HE HAD APPARENTLY ASPIRED TO WHEN HE PARTICIPATED IN BELGRADE CONFERENCE LAST YEAR.

THERE ENSURED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS DURING WHICH STEVENSON AND MCCLOY ATTEMPTED TO DRAW CLEAR LINE BETWEEN IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ~~LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS AGAINST REINTRODUCTION~~ SUCH WEAPONS INTO CUBA. SYG EMPHASIZED THAT CASTRO INSISTED ON RECIPROCITY IN REGARD TO ANY MEASURES OF VERIFICATION OR INSPECTION AND THAT HE, THANT, DOUBTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT EITHER SHORT OR LONG TERM MEASURES OF THIS KIND WITHOUT RECIPROCAL FEATURES. THERE WAS MENTION OF POSSIBLE INSPECTION SOLELY OF CUBAN EXILE CAMPS IN US AND ELSEWHERE AS QUID PRO QUO FOR VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA. US NEGOTIATORS EMPHASIZED IN LATTER CONNECTION THAT MERE INSPECTION OF VACANT MISSILE SITES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT INSPECTORS MUST HAVE FREEDOM TO INVESTIGATE ~~REPORTS OF CONCEALED WEAPONS IN CAVES OR ELSEWHERE.~~ AS TO LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS NARASIMHAN SUGGESTED THAT UN COMMISSION, CONSTITUTED FROM NON-ALIGNED AMBS OR OTHERWISE, MIGHT BE CHARGED ON THE ONE HAND WITH ASSURING THAT THERE WAS NO REINTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ON OTHER HAND OF POLICING ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION OF CUBA BY US AND OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL IT WAS AGREED UN SHOULD FORMULATE IT IN WRITING AND SUBMIT IT TO US FOR STUDY. STEVENSON EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS AND RECALLED THAT THOSE SUGGESTED SO FAR INCLUDE

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CU 951

CWII-717/3

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-3- 1781, November 14, 8 p.m. from New York

(1) SOV ASSURANCES OF NON-REINTRODUCTION, (2) CONTINUED US AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, (3) LA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE WITH APPROPRIATE INSPECTION, AND (4) UN INSPECTION AGAINST REINTRODUCTION AND INVASION AS JUST SUGGESTED BY NARASIMHAN. MCCLOY SUGGESTED IN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN CARIBBEAN AS POSSIBLE VARIANT. UN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT WHETHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONE COULD BE ORGANIZED WITHOUT DELAY OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

IN CONCLUSION THERE WAS BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN FINAL SC MTG ON CUBA. THAMT SAID POSSIBILITIES HE HAD MENTIONED TO SOVS WERE (1) TRADITIONAL SC FORM OF RES, (2) DECLARATIONS BY PARTIES CONCERNED, IN WHICH CASE US STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED BY OAS, WHICH MIGHT BE REPORTED TO SC BY CHILE AND VENEZUELA, (3) JOINT PROTOCOL AGREED BEFORE SC MTG, (4) COMBINATION OF RES AND DECLARATIONS WHEREBY RES MIGHT WELCOME SOME POINTS IN DECLARATIONS AND TAKE NOTE OF OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION VIEW WAS GENERALLY EXPRESSED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON EITHER PROTOCOL OR RES AND THAT JOINT DECLARATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLEST SOLUTION. STEVENSON POINTED OUT THAT US IS OF COURSE NOT IN POSITION TO PREDICT WHAT OAS ACTION MIGHT BE. WE WOULD SUPPOSE OAS MIGHT, AFTER SOVS HAD COMPLIED WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS, REPEAL ITS RES OF OCT 23 BUT WE CANNOT YET KNOW WHAT OTHER ACTION OAS MIGHT TAKE.

STEVENSON

LIR/14

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 11/14/62, 9 PM.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee Per Mr. Rogers 11/14/CWO-W

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CW 952

1181-1184 24:1

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited

UHI 2005

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C	1188	X	15	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
D	1183	X	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
E	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
F	27	28	29	30	31	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
G	1184	X	3	3	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		

The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited: An International Collection of Documents, from the Bay of Pigs to the Brink of Nuclear War

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